- x4.40 - Gold and gold receivables
- x1.08 - Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
- x5.94 - Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
- x2.50 - Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro
- x7.37 - Lending to financial sector counterparties of euro area (5 "then", 5+6 "now")
- x27.87 - Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro
- x0.50 - General government debt denominated in euro
- x3.47 - Other assets
- x2.62 - Banknotes in circulation
- x8.51 - Liabilities to euro area financial counterparties denominated in euro
- x∞ - Debt certificates issued ("now" €0)
- x5.05 - Liabilities to other euro area residents denominated in euro
- x16.04 - Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro
- x4.65 - Liabilities to euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
- x1.66 - Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
- x9.53 - Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF
- x3.72 - Other liabilities
- x6.83 - Revaluation accounts (unrealised MTM asset gains/losses)
- x1.62 - Capital and reserves
- The balance sheet bottom line now is x4.27 what it was back then.
- Gold and gold receivables formed 15% of the balance sheet total both then and now.
- The leverage of total assets against gold and gold receivables, "then" was x6.88, "now" is x6.68.
- Between the revaluation accounts plus capital and reserves, the total equity in the Eurosystem balance sheet is now €492,988,000,000 or so. So I figure they could handle quite a lot of stress before they would have to worry about becoming insolvent.
Meanwhile the Fed's balance sheet is currently leveraged x55 or so (but if they brought the Treasury's gold fully onto the balance sheet at floating market valuation, MTM like the ECB does, they would find themselves with a very similar leverage ratio). It could be time to reconsider the way the Fed's accounting is done?